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Substantive Due Process: 
The Power to Grant Monopolies in the Federalist 
Marketplace of State Experimentation 
ABSTRACT 
Substantive due process is a controversial doctrine due to its lack of a 
limiting principle that prevents courts from creating or extending rights beyond 
the text of the Constitution. This Comment suggests that the effects of 
substantive due process should be evaluated from a perspective of their likely 
effect on the federalist marketplace of state experimentation. From this 
perspective, the application of substantive due process should be limited to 
natural rights, which are the equivalent of natural monopolies in economic 
marketplaces. The remaining rights should be allowed to develop through state 
experimentation. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Substantive due process is one of the most controversial 
doctrines currently applied by the Supreme Court. 1 The doctrine is 
so controversial that its very name has been called a "contradiction 
in terms,"2 an "oxymoron,"3 and even "a momentous sham."4 The 
root of the controversy surrounding the application of substantive 
due process is not that it protects substantive rights through a 
provision requiring procedure, but that it allows the Court to expand 
the protections of the Constitution based on judicial discretion with 
no clear limits. 5 Although substantive due process has been the 
1. Rosalie Berger Levinson, Reining in Abuses of Executive Power Through Substantive Due 
Process, 60 FLA. L. REV. 519, 521 (2008) ("Substantive due process is one of the most confusing 
and most controversial areas of constitutional law."); Stewart M. Weiner, Comment, Substantive 
Due Process in the Twilight Zone: Protecting Property Interests from Arbitrary Land Use Decisions, 69 TEMP. 
L. REV. 1467, 1473 (1996) ("Even when limited to undisputed fundamental rights, substantive 
due process remains a controversial doctrine on which the Supreme Court is bitterly divided."). 
2. John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 493, 
494 (1997). 
3. Mays v. City of E. St. Louis, 123 F.3d 999, 1001 (7th Cir. 1997). 
4. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 31 
(1990). 
5. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (plurality opinion) 
("Substantive due process has at times been a treacherous field for this Court. There are risks 
393 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2013 
vehicle for applying the Bill of Rights to the states through the 
process of incorporation, 6 the most controversial applications of 
substantive due process have been those that, rather than being 
limited by the text of the Constitution, have developed from general 
abstract concepts such as "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and 
tradition" 7 or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.''8 
The search for limitations on substantive due process has 
generated significant scholarship. For example, Thomas W. Merrill 
argues that substantive due process should be limited by general 
principles in the Rules of Decision Act and the Constitution, such as 
separation of powers, federalism, and electoral accountability. 9 
Supreme Court Justices Scalia and Thomas have argued that "deeply 
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" should be strictly 
interpreted and should involve a searching inquiry into practices in 
place at the time that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were 
ratified. 10 
This Comment will argue for similar limits on the application of 
substantive due process by reframing the issue from a concern with 
fundamental rights to a concern with interference on a federalist 
marketplace of state experimentation. Specifically, the marketplace 
of state experimentation should generally be allowed to determine 
the extent of fundamental rights by allowing policies to compete for 
acceptance among the states, unless the rights are natural. Although 
this Comment will address some of the normative concerns 
surrounding the doctrine, the main goal of this Comment is to 
provide an economic framework and economic terminology that can 
be used to discuss the normative effects of substantive due process. 
Substantive due process affects the interaction of the state and 
federal governments in the federalist system. In general, the 
federalist system gives states the ability to experiment with different 
when the judicial branch gives enhanced protection to certain substantive liberties without the 
guidance of the more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. As the history of the Lochner era 
demonstrates, there is reason for concern lest the only limits to such judicial intervention 
become the predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members of this Court."). 
6. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034 (2010). 
7. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 
503). 
8. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
9. Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. I, 3 
(1985). 
10. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 592-98 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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policies and to protect different rights or to protect the same rights 
at different levels. II The importance of this feature of federalism has 
been recognized by the United States Supreme Court, as has the 
seriousness of interfering with it: 
It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; 
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the 
rest of the country. This Court has the power to prevent an 
experiment. ... We have power to do this, because the due 
process clause has been held by the Court applicable to matters of 
substantive law as well as to matters of procedure. But in the 
exercise of this high power, we must be ever on our guard, lest we 
erect our prejudices into legal principles. 12 
In a more recent case, the Supreme Court quoted this language 
with approval on its way to concluding that "the states must be free 
to experiment. . . . [O]nly when the state action infringes 
fundamental guarantees [is the Supreme Court] authorized to 
intervene." 13 
This ability to experiment creates a marketplace of state policies, 
similar to the marketplace of ideas, I4 in which state policies compete 
for acceptance by other states. Like the marketplace of ideas, the 
federalist marketplace of state experimentation provides a test for 
truth as policies emerge from the federalist marketplace by gaining 
the greatest acceptance among the states.Is One of the most 
eloquent descriptions of the marketplace of ideas came in a 
dissenting opinion from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: 
[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in 
ideas . . . the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get 
itself accepted in the competition of the market .... That at any 
rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life 
is an experiment. Every year if not every day we have to wager our 
salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. 
11. Philip ]. Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and Telecommunications Reform, 52 
VAND. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999) ("Moreover, such deference serves an important goal of cooperative 
federalism: it allows for and encourages state experimentation and interstate competition."). 
12. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,311 (1932) (Brandeis,]., dissenting). 
13. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 582 (1981). 
14. For a brief description of the marketplace of ideas, see KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & 
GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 5-6 (4th ed. 2010). 
15. Id. at 6. 
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While that experiment is part of our system I think that we should 
be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of 
opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless 
they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful 
and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is 
required to save the country. 16 
Just as truth is best achieved through the competition of opinion 
experiments within the marketplace of ideas, truth in the form of 
policies is best achieved through the competition of policy 
experiments within the federalist marketplace of state 
experimentation. 
As the United States Supreme Court applies the doctrine of 
substantive due process by declaring that certain rights are 
fundamental, it interferes in the federalist marketplace of state 
experimentation. Once a right is declared to be fundamental, that 
right becomes a "federally protected right beyond any state 
regulation whatever," 17 and, therefore, states may not experiment 
with policies in that area. In other words, rights protected under the 
doctrine of substantive due process are granted monopoly status 
within the federalist marketplace of state experimentation. This 
Comment will explore this monopoly-granting power of the United 
States Supreme Court to determine (1) whether that power was 
intended to be given to the Supreme Court by the drafters and 
ratifiers of the Constitution and its amendments and (2) whether the 
Supreme Court's current use of that power is appropriate from the 
perspective of its effect on the federalist marketplace of state 
experimentation. This Comment will conclude that, although the 
drafters and ratifiers of the Constitution and its amendments 
originally intended the Supreme Court to have the power to grant 
monopolies to rights in the federalist marketplace, that power was 
originally intended to be limited to natural rights. In addition, 
allowing the Supreme Court to exercise its monopoly-granting power 
beyond natural rights is inappropriate when considered from the 
perspective of its effect on the development of policies within the 
federalist marketplace. 
16. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,]., dissenting). 
17. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO 
juDICIAL DOCTRINE 10 (1988). 
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Part II of this Comment will provide background information on 
economic marketplaces, specifically addressing economic 
monopolies, natural monopolies, and the legal standard for when 
economic monopolies are acceptable to society. Part III will apply 
this economic background to the federalist marketplace of state 
experimentation and will provide corresponding descriptions of a 
federalist marketplace monopoly, natural rights, and the legal 
standard for when a federalist marketplace monopoly should be 
acceptable to society. Part IV will then seek to determine whether 
the ability to grant monopolies to rights within the federalist 
marketplace was intended under the Due Process Clauses of the 
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. Part V will discuss the normative 
implications of substantive due process that are highlighted by the 
use of this economic terminology, and Part VI will conclude. 
II. ECONOMIC TERMINOLOGY AND LEGAL DOCTRINE 
A. Economic Monopoly 
In an economic marketplace, a monopoly is a business 
organization with the "power to control prices or exclude 
competition." 18 This can occur when either a single organization 
produces all of the output demanded in the market, 19 or when an 
organization, despite competition from smaller organizations, is so 
large that it has market, or price-setting, power.20 In either case, the 
distinguishing characteristics of an economic monopoly are its ability 
to "control prices and exclude competition."21 
As the only competitor in a market or the most significant 
competitor, a monopoly can affect the price of a product in the 
market by changing its output of the product into the market.22 
Specifically, monopolies tend to decrease the output of a product 
into the market in order to make the product scarcer and to raise the 
product's price. 23 Although firms in a completely competitive market 
also have the ability to change their output, the existence of 
18. United States v. E.l. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). 
19. jAMES R. KEARL, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY: AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH 226-27 
(4th ed. 2007). 
20. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). 
21. !d. at 571 (quoting E I. duPont de Nemours, 351 U.S. at 391). 
22. KEARL, supra note 19, at 227. 
23. ld. at 230. 
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comparable competition prevents their output changes from 
affecting the price of the product in the market. 24 Monopolies can 
use this ability to affect the price of a product in the market to 
maximize profits.25 
In addition to having the power to control prices, an economic 
monopoly also has the power to exclude competition.26 A monopoly 
excludes competition by erecting or benefiting from barriers that 
prevent other firms from entering the market.27 The sources of these 
barriers to entry include "exclusive ownership of a scarce resource," 
"specialized knowledge," "legal restrictions that limit entry by new 
firms," or "business practices" or "cost advantages" of a firm that 
makes entry by other firms unprofitable.28 Hence, if a firm controls 
all of the resources or specialized knowledge needed to make a 
specific product, competing firms will be prevented from enterin§ 
the market due to their lack of access to the necessary resources. 2 
DeBeers of South Africa, for example, has a monopoly in the 
diamond market because it "owns much of the land on which gem-
grade diamonds are easily mined."30 In addition, competitors may 
face legal hurdles that make it unprofitable or overly difficult to 
enter the market.31 These legal hurdles include patents, copyrights, 
and exclusive government licenses, such as the one granted to the 
U.S. Postal service. 32 Finally, some monopolies arise because the 
business practices of the firm or the nature of the product that they 
offer gives large or existing firms an advantage over entering firms. 33 
These monopolies are called natural monopolies and will be 
discussed in more detail below. 34 
Economic monopolies are disfavored in a free-market system.35 
In a perfectly competitive economic market, prices and quantities are 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
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Id. at 227. 
Id. at 227, 237. 
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 571 (citing E.I. duPont de Nemours, 351 U.S. at 391 (1956)). 
KEARL, supra note 19, at 234-35. 
Id. at 235. 
Id. at 235-36. 
I d. at 235. 
Id. at 236. 
I d. 
I d. at 23 7-240. 
See infra Part II. B. 
KEARL, supra note 19, at 231-33. 
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determined by the interplay between supply and demand. 36 
Specifically, at a given price, buyers will be willing to buy a specific 
quantity of product and suppliers will be willing to sell a specific 
quantity of product.37 When those prices and quantities are equal, 
the market is said to be in equilibrium and the result is economically 
efficient. 38 But when a monopoly exists within an economic market, 
the monopoly will restrict output in order to make the product 
scarcer and raise prices.39 Although the price of the product in the 
market is still dependent on the demand for the product, the 
monopoly has power to control the price to a significant degree by 
controlling the level of output. 40 In this way, the monopoly 
maximizes its profits.41 Because the result produces less output into 
the market than would be produced in the absence of a monopoly, 
the market is not in equilibrium and the result is not efficient.42 
Therefore, monopolies introduce inefficiencies into the market due 
to insufficient supply and higher prices for consumers. 
B. Natural Monopoly 
As mentioned above, 43 natural monopolies arise because the 
product or service that they offer gives large or existing firms a 
natural advantage over entering firms. 44 In other words, natural 
monopolies "can produce all of the output for the market at a cost 
lower than a group of smaller competitive firms can."45 Although 
several characteristics of a firm may cause it to be a natural 
monopoly, the most significant, for the purposes of this Comment, is 
that the initial start-up costs for the firm are high compared to the 
marginal cost of providing the product or service to one additional 
person once the start-up costs have been invested.46 
36. Id. at 63. 
37. !d. 
38. Id. at 65, 167. 
39. Id. at 232-33. 
40. !d. at 230-31. 
41. Id. at 233. 
42. I d. at 232. 
43. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34. 
44. KEARL, supra note 19, at 238-39; see also Shubha Ghosh, Decoding and Recoding Natural 
Monopoly, Deregulation, and Intellectual Property, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1125, 1138-39 & n.63 (2008). 
45. KEARL, supra note 19, at 762. 
46. Id. at 239-40. 
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Currently, the most common types of natural monopolies are 
public utilities such as "electrical power, local telephone service, 
water, natural gas, and sewage disposal companies."47 However, 
because " [ t] he underlying reason for natural monopol [ies] is 
technological,"48 the industries that include natural monopolies have 
the potential to change over time as technology changes. 
Considering sewer services as an example, the initial investment for 
a sewer company of installing main sewer lines is substantial.49 But 
once the initial investment has been made, the cost of providing 
sewer services to one additional person within the service area is 
much less substantial, involving only the hook-up from the already-
existing line in the street. 50 Therefore, the first firm to lay sewer 
lines throughout a community is naturally at an advantage compared 
to later firms that may attempt to compete with it because the first 
firm can offer the same services with less cost to new customers and 
can spread the cost over more customers.51 The establishment of a 
natural monopoly within a community makes competition against it 
irrational because the likelihood of success is small. 52 
C. Acceptable Economic Monopolies 
Even though they are disfavored, economic monopolies are not 
per se illegal in the United States.53 For example, natural 
monopolies are often unavoidable, so their existence does not 
constitute a punishable offense. 54 However, because natural 
monopolies still produce market inefficiencies and higher prices for 
47. /d. 
48. THOMAS). MICELI, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 330 (2d ed. 2009). 
49. KEARL, supra note 19, at 240. 
50. Id. 
51. /d. 
52. /d. at 239. 
53. Geoffrey A. Manne & joshua D. Wright, Coogle and the Limits of Antitrust: The Case 
Against the Case Against Coogle, 34 HARV. j.L. & PUB. POL'Y 171, 217 (2011) ("Mere possession of 
monopoly power is not an antitrust offense."). 
54. Ghosh, supra note 44, at 1152 ("A natural monopoly is a construct used to identify 
certain market conditions that support only one supplier in order to promote efficiency. This 
construct is used to recognize that in some situations, the norm of competition may not lead to 
the most socially desirable result from the perspective of efficiency. In the case of natural 
monopoly, market competition may even be destructive to social goals. As a result, some 
correction is needed to protect society from the consequences of unchecked natural 
monopoly."). 
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consumers, they are generally publicly owned and subject to 
significant regulation, including price regulation. 55 
In addition to natural monopolies, other monopolies can legally 
exist in the market if they achieved their monopoly status through 
effective competition within the economic marketplace. 56 When a 
business organization is accused of operating as an economic 
monopoly, a court will determine whether the organization's 
monopoly status was achieved through illegal methods, such as 
collusion or price discrimination, or through legal methods, such as 
"superior skill, foresight, and industry"57 or "as a consequence of a 
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident."58 These 
monopolies produced through successful competition are not 
protected and regulated like natural monopolies; rather, these 
monopolies are simply tolerated within economic markets. In other 
words, monopolies are legal or acceptable to society if they are 
regulated natural monopolies or if they achieved their monopoly 
status by competing effectively within the economic marketplace. 
Ill. INCORPORATING ECONOMIC TERMINOLOGY INTO THE FEDERALIST 
MARKETPLACE 
Economic monopoly concepts illuminate the effects of protecting 
fundamental rights under the doctrine of substantive due process on 
the federalist marketplace of state experimentation. Although the 
economic marketplace and the federalist marketplace have 
significant differences, 59 the reliance on competition to produce the 
most efficient or effective result is evident in both marketplaces and 
is useful for evaluating consequences in the federalist marketplace. 60 
55. KEARL, supra note 19, at 267-69. 
56. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) ("The 
successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he 
wins."). 
57. Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701, 712 (7th Cir. 1977) 
(quoting Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 430) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
58. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). 
59. For a summary of scholarship comparing and contrasting the marketplace of ideas 
with the economic marketplace, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech and Unfree Markets, 42 
UCLA L. REV. 949 (1995). 
60. See R. H. Coase, The Economics of the First Amendment: The Market for Goods and the Market 
for Ideas, 64 AM. EcoN. REV. 384, 389 (1974) ("There is no fundamental difference between [the 
market for goods and the market for ideas] and, in deciding on public policy with regard to 
them, we need to take into account the same considerations."). 
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A. Federalist Marketplace Monopoly 
A monopoly in the federalist marketplace is different from an 
economic monopoly in several ways. The federalist marketplace is 
not dependent on the prices of products, so price control is irrelevant 
to a federalist marketplace monopoly. Similarly, because policies are 
accepted or rejected politically instead of bought and sold, a right in 
the federalist marketplace successfully competes by maximizing 
acceptance, not profits. In addition, the inefficiency of a monopoly in 
the federalist marketplace is not high prices and low supply but is 
instead the failure of the policy to develop into its most acceptable 
and effective form. 
Both economic and federalist monopolies have power to exclude 
competition. Although an economic monopoly may rely on several 
different sources of power to exclude, such as control of resources or 
a favorable production process, 61 federalist marketplace monopolies 
exclude competitors through societal and legal-notably 
constitutional-barriers to entry. Societal barriers to entry are 
societal or institutional norms that are so well-founded within the 
society that competing policies are at a significant disadvantage in 
terms of gaining acceptance. 62 Legal barriers to entry are 
constitutional text or court decisions that protect a right so 
completely as to make infringement of that right illegal.63 Both of 
these barriers prevent competing policies from entering the federalist 
marketplace. 
B. Natural Rights: Natural Monopolies in the Federalist Marketplace 
The exact definition of natural rights, and especially which rights 
qualify as natural rights, is a source of wide disagreement among 
scholars.64 For the purposes of this Comment, natural rights are 
61. KEARL, supra note 19, at 235. 
62. See, e.g., John Godard, The Exceptional Decline of the American Labor Movement, 63 INDUS. 
& LAB. REL. REV. 82, 87 (2009) ("[D)ominant institutional norms and the mobilization biases 
they generated ensured that ... challenges would have little chance of succeeding .... "); 
Colleen Sheppard, Equality Rights and Institutional Change: Insights from Canada and the United States, 
15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 143, 161 (1998) (commenting that "traditional institutional 
norms ... may well be resistant to change"). 
63. NELSON, supra note 17, at 199 (discussing the "authority for the federal courts to 
immunize fundamental rights from all legislative regulation"). 
64. Jason S. Marks, Beyond Penumbras and Emanations: Fundamental Rights, the Spirit of the 
Revolution, and the Ninth Amendment, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 435, 454 (1995) ("Expressions 
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defined as those rights within the federalist marketplace that 
coincide with natural monopolies within economic marketplaces. 
Under this definition, natural rights have two significant properties. 
First, natural rights are so entrenched within society that competing 
ideas have significant societal barriers to overcome in order to enter 
the federalist marketplace to sufficiently compete with the natural 
rights. This property suggests that natural rights can be identified by 
the existence of two major characteristics: (I) strong social or 
political foundations, and (2) essentially no viable competing 
policies within the federalist marketplace. Second, just as the 
industries that include natural monopolies may change as technology 
changes, the rights that qualify as natural rights may change as the 
foundational ideas and policies within society change, although the 
bar to become a natural right remains high. Therefore, natural rights 
always constitute a finite, definable set of rights at any given time, 
although the rights that qualify as natural rights may change slightly 
over time. 
C. Acceptable Federalist Marketplace Monopolies 
As in the economic marketplace, monopolies in the federalist 
marketplace are not per se unacceptable. Natural rights, like natural 
monopolies, are inevitable within a society because some rights 
attain wide acceptance or are naturally inherent within a free society. 
Because these rights have established strong foundations within 
society, they naturally have an advantage over new and competing 
ideas. 65 Like economic natural monopolies, these rights should be 
brought under government control and regulated by the 
government.66 For several of the natural rights within the United 
States, this has been accomplished by including the rights within the 
United States Constitution and by regulating them in federal and 
such as 'liberty,' 'power,' and 'natural rights' escape simple definition."). 
65. See Kimberly C. Shankman & Roger Pilon, Reviving the Privileges or Immunities Clause to 
Redress the Balance Among States, Individuals, and the Federal Government, 3 TEX. REV. L. & PoL. 1, 7 
(1998) (mentioning that "the natural rights principles of the Declaration of Independence ... 
form the intellectual foundation of American constitutionalism"). 
66. Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Rights Done Right: A Critique of Libertarian Originalism, 78 
UMKC L. REV. 661, 666 (2010) ("[T]he Framers never intended, unless they were reduced to a 
written, positive legal protection, that natural rights be treated as directly enforceable legal 
rights."). 
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state courts. 67 Because many of these natural rights are essential to 
the United States' system of government, such as the right to vote or 
otherwise participate in the political process, protecting them fosters 
competition in the federalist marketplace instead of inhibiting it. 
In addition to natural rights, rights can achieve monopoly status 
in the federalist marketplace in a way acceptable to society by 
successfully competing within that marketplace. These rights, 
although not initially commonly accepted or inherent in the 
structures of the government, emerge from the federalist 
marketplace by being accepted by many more states than their 
competitors. 68 These successful competitors are sometimes added to 
the Constitution through amendment, such as the voting rights for 
blacks69 and women. 70 At other times, these rights are recognized by 
the courts, though not expressly enumerated in the Constitution. 71 
However, like successful competitors in economic markets, even 
though these monopolies are appropriately recognized within the 
federalist marketplace, they should not be constitutionally 
entrenched by the courts. They should instead be subject to 
competition in the federalist marketplace. 
IV. ORIGINAL INTENT REGARDING GRANTING RIGHTS A MONOPOLY IN 
THE FEDERALIST MARKETPLACE 
The fact that federalist marketplace monopolies exist does not 
answer the question of whether the power to grant monopoly status 
to specific rights was originally intended by the drafters and ratifiers 
of the Constitution and its amendments. Furthermore, recognizing 
that the federal government has granted monopoly status to rights 
within the federalist marketplace also does not answer the question 
whether those monopolies are good or bad for society. This Part will 
67. Terry Brennan, Natural Rights and the Constitution: The Original "Original Intent", 15 
HARV. j.L. & PUB. POL'Y 965, 966 (1992) (agreeing with Judge Bork that "enumerated rights are 
specific examples of the larger array of natural rights"). 
68. ANDREW KARCH, DEMOCRATIC LABORATORIES: POLICY DIFFUSION AMONG THE 
AMERICAN STATES 14 (2007) ("The notion that the states are laboratories of democracy posits 
that innovative policies can be implemented in individual states and then disseminated if they 
prove successful."). 
69. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
70. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
71. See Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283, 492 (1849) (recognizing a "right to pass and repass 
through every part of [the United States] without interruption"). 
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address whether the original intent of the Framers of the 
Constitution and its amendments envisioned the federal 
government's use of its monopoly-granting power in the federalist 
marketplace. The following Part will address the normative 
implications of that use. 
This Part will begin by addressing the original intent manifest by 
the drafting and ratification of the Bill of Rights. The Part will then 
address the additional light on original intent obtained by looking at 
the courts' use of general constitutional law in the years leading up 
to the drafting and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Next, 
this Part will address the original intent regarding granting 
monopolies in the federalist marketplace evidenced by the history 
surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, this Part will look 
at the Court's use of substantive due process and seek to determine 
whether that use is consistent with the original intentions of the 
drafters and ratifiers of the Constitution and its subsequent 
amendments. 
A. Bill of Rights 
The drafting and ratification of the Bill of Rights provides clear 
evidence that the drafters and ratifiers of the Constitution intended 
certain rights to be granted monopoly status in the federalist 
marketplace, at least with respect to competing regulations by the 
federal government. However, the rights to which this status could 
be granted were limited to natural rights. The need for a Bill of 
Rights was debated by the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists 
during the state ratification debates. The Anti-Federalists argued 
that the Constitution was incomplete without "the most express and 
full declaration of rights," which would "expressly reserv[e] to the 
people such of their essential rights as are not necessary to be parted 
with."72 The Federalist response generally included two arguments. 
First, the design of the federal Constitution was such that "Congress 
can have no right to exercise any power but what is contained" in the 
Constitution, and, therefore, a bill of rights was unnecessary. 73 
Second, attempting to create a bill of rights would be "dangerous" 
72. RANDY E. BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES IN CONTEXT 31-32 (2008) (quoting 
Brutus II, Editorial, N.Y.]., Nov. 1, 1787 (attributed to Robert Yates)). 
73. James Iredell, Speech to the North Carolina Ratification Convention Quly 29, 1788), 
in BARNETT, supra note 72, at 31. 
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because "it would be implying, in the strongest manner, that every 
right not included in the exception might be impaired by the 
government without usurpation; and it would be impossible to 
enumerate every one."74 All of these arguments, those made by the 
Anti-Federalists and those made by the Federalists, assume "that 
natural and customary rights existed independently of the federal 
Constitution or any other text" and that adding a list of rights to the 
federal Constitution would simply "declare the existence of these 
rights in a textual enumeration," rather than create them?5 
Given that a Bill of Rights would simply declare, and not create, 
rights, James Madison's speech to Congress introducing the Bill of 
Rights suggests which rights were considered to exist, and, 
therefore, which were considered natural rights as this Comment has 
defined them. In that speech, Madison, by using phrases such as "a 
declaration of the rights of the people" and "fortify the rights of the 
people," showed that he agreed with the general assumption that 
listing rights to be protected in the Constitution was recognizing, 
but not creating, those rights?6 In addition, Madison described the 
rights to be protected as either "those rights which are retained 
when particular powers are given up to be exercised by the 
legislature," which Madison's notes impliedly refer to "natural 
rights" such as the freedom of speech, or those rights "which may 
seem to result from the nature of the compact," which Madison said 
included "[t]rial by jury."77 Due to the fears that enumerating rights 
might imply that other rights do not exist, Madison suggested 
adding the following language as part of one of the amendments: 
"The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in favor 
of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just 
importance of other rights retained by the pe~le,"78 which served as 
the basis for the eventual Ninth Amendment. 
These comments from the Anti-Federalists, the Federalists, and 
Madison's speech imply two important concepts relating to the 
74. Id. 
75. Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna Carta, 
Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585, 636-38 (2009). 
76. james Madison, Madison's Speech to the House Introducing a Bill of Rights Qune 8, 
1789), in BARNETT, supra note 72, at 43-44. 
77. !d. at 40. 
78. Id. at 38. 
79. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
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intended extent of the federal government's power to grant 
monopolies to specific rights. First, there was a known, finite group 
of rights with strong social or political foundations that were 
deserving of protection and only part of which were enumerated in 
the Bill of Rights. Second, these rights had no viable competitors 
because they were either naturally retained by the people or essential 
to the system of government formed by the Constitution. Therefore, 
they qualified as natural rights as this Comment has defined them. 
Despite these important concepts, the Bill of Rights says little 
about the intended extent of the federal government's power to 
grant monopolies in the federalist marketplace because the amendments 
only applied to the federal government and not to the states. In his 
speech, Madison proposed broad language for several of the rights 
and specifically suggested some of the rights should be applied to the 
states, including "the equal rights of conscience," "the freedom of 
the press," and "the trial by jury."80 However, Madison's proposed 
language was changed to apfly only to Congress,81 and the Supreme 
Court, in Barron v. Baltimore, 2 interpreted these amendments to only 
apply to the federal government. Given the changes to Madison's 
proposals, "[m]ost scholars have concluded that [Chief justice] 
Marshall's reading of the intent of the framers of the Bill of Rights 
[in Barron v. Baltimore] was correct" and that the case "was correctly 
decided."83 
Therefore, the original drafters and ratifiers of the Bill of Rights 
recognized a finite category of natural rights deserving of monopoly 
status, but that monopoly status only prevented competing policies 
and regulations from the federal government and not from the 
states. 
B. General Constitutional Law 
Even though the original drafters and ratifiers of the Bill of 
Rights apparently did not intend it to apply to the states, state 
supreme courts and the United States Supreme Court would still 
apply principles embodied within that instrument to the states 
80. Madison, supra note 76, at 38. 
81. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law .... "). 
82. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833). 
83. MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 23 (1986). 
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through the application of general constitutionallaw.84 Section 25 of 
the Judiciary Act of 1789 only gave the United States Supreme Court 
appellate jurisdiction over state supreme court decisions if those 
decisions held that a federal right was denied by the Constitution. 85 
Therefore, a robust development of general constitutional law, 
sometimes with specific references to the Bill of Rights, existed that 
was beyond the supervision of the United States Supreme Court.86 
However, Swift v. Tyson, interpreting Section 34 of the Judiciary Act, 
known as the Rules of Decision Act, held that federal courts acting 
under diversity jurisdiction could apply general constitutional law, 
instead of strictly adhering to positive state law, to decide its cases.87 
Therefore, between the time of the ratification of the Bill of Rights 
and the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, both state 
supreme courts and the United States Supreme Court recognized 
and protected unenumerated rights in diversity cases through the 
application of general constitutional law. 
Even though unenumerated rights were recognized and 
protected during this period, the rights that were protected still 
largely fell within a finite set of rights that this Comment has 
defined as natural rights, those with strong social or political 
foundations and no viable competitors within the federalist 
marketplace. The classic statement, recognized in much of the 
Fourteenth Amendment literature, 88 of unenumerated rights 
encompassed within general constitutional law is the list provided by 
Justice Bushrod Washington in Corfield v. Coryell. 89 In that case, 
Justice Washington was interpreting the rights that fell within the 
"privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states."90 In 
doing so, Justice Washington felt 
no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and 
immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, 
of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at 
all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which 
84. jason Mazzone, The Bill of Rights in the Early State Courts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1, 59-60 
(2007). 
85. !d. at 19. 
86. !d. at 21. 
87. 41 u.s. 1, 19 (1842). 
88. See CURTIS, supra note 83, at 66-67; NELSON, supra note 17, at 24-25. 
89. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230). 
90. U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 2. 
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compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, 
independent, and sovereign. 91 
He further suggested that all of the rights are known and within a 
finite set by stating that it would be "more tedious than difficult to 
enumerate" them.92 Justice Washington then provided a list of 
general categories under which "all" of the fundamental principles 
would reside:93 
Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, 
with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to 
pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to 
such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the 
general good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one state to pass 
through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, 
agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit 
of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of 
any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and dispose of 
property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher 
taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state; 
may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and 
immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general 
description of privileges deemed to be fundamental; to which may 
be added, the elective franchise, as regulated and established bl the 
laws or constitution of the state in which it is to be exercised. 9 
Therefore, although general constitutional law allowed the 
federal courts to grant monopolies to rights in the federalist 
marketplace in diversity cases, the use of that power was generally 
limited in those cases to granting monopolies to rights that had 
strong social foundations and that were recognized in all states. That 
doctrine was only used to protect rights that could be described as 
"fundamental laws of every free government,"95 "fundamental 
principle[s] of a republican government,"96 "common principles of 
justice and civil liberty,"97 and "settled principle[s] of universal 
91. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551 (emphasis added). 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 551-52. 
95. Trs. of Dartmouth Col!. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 592 n.12 (1819). 
96. Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. 43, 50-51 (1815). 
97. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 671 (1870). 
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law."98 In other words, this power was limited to protecting natural 
rights, as this Comment has defined them. 
C. Fourteenth Amendment 
Even though general constitutional law allowed some 
unenumerated rights to be protected by the federal government in a 
limited amount of circumstances, the Republicans within the Thirty-
Ninth Congress, after the Civil War, wanted to ensure that certain 
rights would be protected, especially for the newly freed slaves. 99 
Therefore, they proposed, drafted, and ratified constitutional 
amendments, including the Fourteenth Amendment. 100 However, 
despite the general consensus that the Fourteenth Amendment was 
meant to secure certain rights for the newly freed slaves, even 
against the states, the extent of those rights has been a source of 
nearly constant debate since the Amendment's ratification. 101 
Scholars argue whether the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to 
apply the Bill of Rights to the states and over the extent of the rights 
covered by the language of this Amendment. However, even scholars 
like Michael Kent Curtis, who propose an "expansive reading of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's framing and ratification,"102 generally 
agree that the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended 
to extend beyond the category of rights referred to by this Comment 
as natural rights. 
Michael Kent Curtis, in his work on the history, drafting, 
ratification, and subsequent interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, argues forcefully that "the Fourteenth Amendment was 
intended to change things so that states could no longer violate 
rights in the federal Bill ofRights." 103 Justice Hugo Black shared this 
view of the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment, as revealed in his 
dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California, which was joined by three 
other Justices. 104 Pulling extensively from the congressional debates 
surrounding the drafting and ratification of the Fourteenth 
98. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chi., 166 U.S. 226, 238 (1897). 
99. CURTIS, supra note 83, at 57-58. 
100. Id. 
101. For a review of the major literature surrounding this debate, see NELSON, supra note 
17,at1-4. 
102. Id. at 3. 
103. CURTIS, supra note 83, at 2. 
104. 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (1947) (Black,]., dissenting). 
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Amendment, Curtis argues that the amendment was intended to 
"protect[] fundamental rights from violation by the states," 
including "rights not explicitly listed in the Constitution." 105 
However, Curtis also mentions that "fundamental" was frequently 
used at that time as a synonym for "constitutional."106 Although 
Curtis states that "there was no consensus on what these 
[unenumerated] rights were,'dO? they were understood as rights 
with "which all Republican writers of authority agree in declaring 
fundamental and essential to citizenship" and which can be found in 
"the Declaration of American Independence" and "every scrap of 
American history." 108 Therefore, although a complete consensus on 
the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment may not have 
existed, the rights were still viewed as "fixed and absolute" and as 
"existing rights" that were simply "given additional protection." 109 
Despite Curtis's evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment was 
meant to apply the Bill of Rights and other fundamental rights 
within a finite set to the states, the Supreme Court made that 
intended meaning "of only academic interest" 110 when it limited the 
reach of the Fourteenth Amendment in the Slaughter-House Cases, 111 
United States v. Cruikshank, 112 and Walker v. Sauvinet. 113 
In contrast to Curtis, William E. Nelson argues that the 
Fourteenth Amendment was not meant to apply the Bill of Rights to 
the states. 114 This theory was also argued b~ many other scholars, 
including Charles Fairman and Raoul Berger. 15 Nelson's main point 
is that the Fourteenth Amendment sought to constitutionalize 
general principles such as "the sanctity of rights, the maintenance of 
equality, and the preservation of state and local power," but those 
principles did not require the application of one, specific legal 
doctrine. 116 In fact, "as it emerged from congressional and state 
105. CURTIS, supra note 83, at 82, 112. 
106. Jd. at 112-14. 
107. Id. at 82. 
108. I d. at 162, 165 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
109. Id. at 167 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
110. Id. at 170. 
111. 83 U.S. 36 (1872). 
112. 92 u.s. 542 (1875). 
113. 92 u.s. 90 (1875). 
114. NELSON, supra note 17. 
115. Id. at 3. 
116. Id. at 8-9. 
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ratification debates," Nelson argues that the Fourteenth Amendment 
"had at least two possible meanings." 117 The Amendment could be 
used to protect "either equal rights or absolute rights." 118 According 
to Nelson, the Court initially chose to follow the equal rights 
interpretation, "that the Fourteenth Amendment would not, in and 
of itself, create rights, but would leave that task to state law; the 
amendment's sole restriction on state legislative freedom would lie 
in its requirement that the states confer equal rights on all." 119 
However, even the absolute rights interpretation was limited in its 
extent. According to Nelson, those who adhered to the absolute 
rights interpretation consider the Amendment to "protect[] 
absolutely certain fundamental rights such as those specified in the 
Bill of Rights and those given by common law to enter contracts and 
to own property," but, even under this interpretation, "states would 
remain free to regulate those rights for the public good in a 
reasonable fashion." 120 
Therefore, even though scholars argue over the intended extent 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, especially about whether or not the 
amendment was intended to apply the Bill of Rights to the states, 
scholars on both sides of the issue generally agree that the 
Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to protect rights beyond 
those that this Comment defines as natural rights. Even those 
scholars who argue for the more broad interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's coverage confine that coverage to a finite 
set of rights with strong foundations within society and with few 
competing policies among the states. 
D. Substantive Due Process 
Although the Fourteenth Amendment was arguably intended to 
allow the federal courts to constitutionally protect a significant 
amount of rights, even against action by the states, 121 unenumerated 
rights were still generally only protected by federal courts in 
117. Id. at 151. 
118. I d. 
119. Id. at 150. 
120. I d. 
121. Kermit Roosevelt III, Forget the Fundamentals: Fixing Substantive Due Process, 8 U. PA. ]. 
CONST. L 983, 986 n.l4 (2006) ("The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was 
understood to federalize the general constitutional law, making it a resource courts could use to 
strike down state laws in the exercise of federal question jurisdiction."). 
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diversity cases through the application of general constitutional 
law. 122 This was largely due to the narrow reading of the language 
within the Fourteenth Amendment given by the Supreme Court in 
cases such as The Slaughter-House Cases 123 and United States v. 
Cruikshank. 124 Even after the creation of general federal question 
jurisdiction in 1875, giving federal courts the authority to hear cases 
related to federal law in contexts other than diversity, the Rules of 
Decision Act still limited the application of general constitutional 
law to diversity cases. 125 
Eventually, the Supreme Court did level the playing field 
between diversity and federal question cases by applying the 
principles of general constitutional law through the due process 
clause, a doctrine that has come to be known as substantive due 
process. The first major case to apply general constitutional 
principles through the due process clause was Chicago, Burlington, & 
Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago. 126 That case applied the principle 
of just compensation found within the Fifth Amendment, thoufh it 
did not specifically mention that amendment in its decision. 1 7 In 
general, substantive due process cases that followed this initial case 
similarly applied principles within the Bill of Rights or other 
commonly accepted or essential principles, those referred to as 
natural rights as defined within this Comment. 
Although this doctrine of substantive due process was initially 
only used by the courts to grant monopolies to natural rights within 
the federalist marketplace, the doctrine eventually expanded to grant 
monopolies to other rights that do not fit this Comment's definition 
of natural rights. Some scholars, such as William E. Nelson, 128 argue 
that this expansion of substantive due process outside the realm of 
natural rights began with Lochner v. New York. 129 Although Lochner 
arguably involved the natural right of freedom of contract, the 
opinion began the Court's journey into "uncharted directions 
122. Michael G. Collins, Before Lochner-Diversity Jurisdiction and the Development of General 
Constitutional Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1307-10 (2000). 
123. 83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
124. 92 U.S. 542 (1876). 
125. Collins, supra note 122, at 1311. 
126. 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
127. !d. 
128. See NELSON, supra note 17, at 198. 
129. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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authorized neither by a uniformly shared original understanding of 
the Fourteenth Amendment nor by the three decades of case law 
following it." 130 According to Nelson, this uncharted direction was a 
shift from using the Fourteenth Amendment as a "bar to arbitrary 
and unequal state action" to using it as a "charter identifying 
fundamental rights and immunizing them from all legislative 
regulation." 131 This shift was significant because it went from 
instituting general and reasonable regulations on the competition 
within the federalist marketplace to granting monopolies within that 
marketplace to specific policies by virtually eliminating all competing 
policies through legal barriers. 
Although the Supreme Court's use of substantive due process to 
invalidate state economic regulations essentially ended with West 
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 132 the Court, through footnote four in 
United States v. Carotene Products Co., 133 gave itself significant power 
over noneconomic rights at the expense of state power to regulate 
those rights. 134 The noneconomic rights constitutionally protected 
by the Court after Carotene Products were not necessarily natural 
rights and, at times, were declared to be fundamental in the face of 
significant state regulation of those rights. Therefore, these rights 
provide an example of inappropriate interference in the federalist 
marketplace of state experimentation because the Court is 
constitutionally protecting rights that are not natural monopolies in 
the federalist marketplace and that are, at times, not even successful 
competitors within that marketplace. A significant group of these 
rights are progeny of the Court's recognition of a general right of 
privacy. 
The Court first recognized the modern version of a right of 
privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut when it held that a married couple 
has a constitutional right to use contraceptives. 135 In recognizing a 
"zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional 
guarantees,'.I 36 the Court was using substantive due process to 
extend constitutional protection to an unenumerated right. Although 
130. NELSON, supra note 17, at 198. 
131. Id. at 199. 
132. 300 u.s. 379 (1937). 
133. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
134. NElSON, supra note 17, at 200. 
135. 381 u.s. 479 (1965). 
136. !d. at 485. 
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the Court described the "right of privacy" as being "older than the 
Bill of Rights-older than our political parties, older than our school 
system,',r 37 the right did not necessarily have strong social or 
political foundations at the time the case was decided and, therefore, 
state prohibition of that right was a viable competitor within the 
federalist marketplace. 
Regardless of the appropriateness of the Supreme Court's use of 
its monopoly-granting power in Griswold, the Court's subsequent 
extensions of the right of privacy are almost certainly inappropriate 
uses of the Court's power when viewed from the perspective of their 
effect on the federalist marketplace of state experimentation. Several 
years after the Griswold decision, the Court extended the right to use 
contraceptives to unmarried couples based on that same right of 
privacy. 138 "If the right of privacy means anything," the Court stated, 
"it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally 
affectin~ a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a 
child." 1 9 The following year, in Roe v. Wade, the Court used the right 
of privacy to establish a pregnant woman's right to terminate her 
pregnancy. 140 According to the Court, the right to decide '"whether 
or not to bear or beget a child' . . . necessarily includes the right of 
a woman to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." 141 
Finally, in Lawrence v. Texas, 142 the Court "in effect asserted a broad 
constitutional right to sexual privacy" by invalidating a "Texas ban 
on consensual sodomy." 143 The Court in Lawrence concluded that the 
"right to liberty under the Due Process Clause" includes the right to 
"engage[] in sexual practices common to a homosexuallifestyle." 144 
Eisenstadt, Roe, and Lawrence are all examples of the Court's 
inappropriate use of substantive due process to constitutionally 
protect rights that are not natural rights, as this Comment has 
defined them, those with strong social or political foundations and 
137. Id. at 486. 
138. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
139. Id. at 453. 
140. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
141. Id. at 169-70 (quoting Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453). 
142. 539 u.s. 558 (2003). 
143. jAY M. SHAFRITZ, KAREN S. LAYNE, & CHRISTOPHER P. BORICK, CLASSICS OF PUBLIC 
POLICY 282 (2005). 
144. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
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no viable competitors within the federalist marketplace. In addition, 
the rights recognized in those cases had not even proven themselves 
through competition in the federalist marketplace, in which case 
they should only be recognized and not constitutionally entrenched. 
For example, the Court readily admits in Roe that statutes similar to 
Texas's criminal abortion law "are in existence in a majority of the 
States," 145 and the Court's description of the right protected in 
Lawrence as an "emerging awareness" 146 suggests that the right 
cannot be described as so entrenched in our society that competing 
ideas are at a natural disadvantage. 
V. ECONOMIC INSIGHTS ABOUT SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
Monopolies are disfavored in both economic markets, due to the 
inefficient effects of higher prices and lower availability, 147 and in 
the federalist market of state experimentation, due to the effect of 
less-developed policies. 148 Despite their disfavored status, some 
monopolies are inevitable in both markets and should be 
controlled. 149 Natural monopolies in economic markets are generally 
controlled through public ownership and regulation. 150 Natural 
rights in the federalist marketplace are best controlled through 
enumeration and subsequent regulation by the courts. 151 
Monopolies other than natural monopolies are only tolerated 
within economic marketplaces if they have successfully competed in 
those marketplaces through "superior skill, foresight, and 
industry" 152 or "as a consequence of a superior product, business 
acumen, or historic accident." 153 In a like manner, monopolies for 
other than natural rights within the federalist marketplace should 
only be tolerated if those policies have successfully competed in that 
145. Roe, 410 U.S. at 118. 
146. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572. 
147. KEARL, supra note 19, at 231-33. 
148. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 3 I 1 (1932) (Brandeis,]., dissenting). 
149. KEARL, supra note 19, at 238-40; see also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542,554 
(1875) (noting the existence of "fundamental rights which belong to every citizen as a member 
of society" and the need to protect those rights against encroachment). 
150. KEARL, supra note 19, at 267-69. 
15 I. Spiropoulos, supra note 66, at 666. 
152. Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701, 712 (7th Cir. 1977) 
(quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
153. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). 
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marketplace as evidenced by widespread state acceptance. 154 Despite 
being tolerated, economic monopolies that have successfully 
competed do not receive protection from subsequent competition 
after being recognized, and, therefore, policies that successfully 
compete in the federalist marketplace should not receive 
constitutional protection upon recognition. 
In the absence of widespread and continuing state acceptance, 
monopolies should not be granted to rights, judicially or otherwise, 
and the federalist marketplace should be allowed to continue to 
operate without barriers. Prematurely granting a right a monopoly 
within the federalist marketplace is the equivalent of granting an up-
and-coming company a monopoly in the economic marketplace 
because it is emerging or beginning to gain greater acceptance. The 
optimal situation would be to let the right, or the company, compete 
in the marketplace until a clear victor emerges and then to 
appropriately recognize, but not necessarily protect, that victor. 
Under this standard, cases like Lochner, Roe, and Lawrence were 
arguably wrongly decided. 155 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Limiting the Supreme Court's ability to declare fundamental 
rights through the application of substantive due process to those 
rights which this Comment calls natural rights may seem excessively 
restrictive given "the balance struck by this country, having regard to 
what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as 
well as the traditions from which it broke.'>l 56 The danger in putting too 
much emphasis on tradition is that "the law on occasion adheres to 
doctrinal concepts long after the reasons which gave them birth have 
disappeared and after experience suggests the need for change," 157 
and too heavy a focus on tradition may "render [the law] incapable 
of progress or improvement." 158 Slavery is so glaring an example of 
154. See KARCH, supra note 68, at 14. 
155. See McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3062 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(citing Lochner, Roe, and Lawrence as examples of protecting unenumerated rights beyond the 
original intent of the Due Process Clause). 
156. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
157. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48 (1980). 
158. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516,529 (1884). 
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the dangers of adherence to inappropriate tradition that there is 
almost no need to mention it here. At the same time, a privilefe with 
a "long history . . . ought not to be casually cast aside," 59 nor 
should "arrangements [that] are of too recent an origin" be able to 
claim protection as easily as those sanctioned by tradition. 160 
In order to give tradition its due deference while still allowing for 
the law to progress and improve, the federalist marketplace of state 
experimentation should be allowed to function without significant 
federal government interference, except in the case of natural rights. 
The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of letting the 
political process function unfettered in several different opinions. 
For example, the Court had described "the right of the people to 
make their own laws, and alter them at their pleasure" as "the 
greatest security" for the "fundamental principles of liberty and 
justice."161 Carolene Product's footnote four, in addition to describing 
a finite set of categories which should receive the highest level of 
scrutiny, also mentions the political process as the process normally 
to be relied upon to secure the rights of minorities. 162 The 
increasingly common use of the courts, instead of the political 
process, to secure minority rights has caused some to question 
whether Carolene Products has been misapplied to the point of losing 
sight of the principle that "minorities are supposed to lose in a 
democratic system."163 
Allowing the Supreme Court to protect rights only because they 
have gained widespread acceptance among the states also inhibits 
the democratic system because it assumes that state experimentation 
achieves the preferred policy the first time. According to John Stuart 
Mill, assuming that the currently accepted idea is infallible removes 
it from the beneficial process of being solidified, improved, or 
replaced, depending on its degree of truthfulness, through 
competition with opposing ideas. 1 4 In addition to preventing the 
currently preferred policy from being beneficially developed, granting 
a monopoly to that policy also prevents the pendulum from swinging 
159. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 48. 
160. johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 786 (Cal. 1993). 
161. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 535. 
162. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
163. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 719 (1985). 
164. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 14, at 5~6 (quoting jOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 
(1859)). 
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back in response to an overly ambitious, but popular, policy. 165 For 
example, the trend in the late 1970s and 1980s in adoption policy 
was "toward protectinft parental rights and preventing their 
premature termination." 66 However, more recently "the pendulum 
has swung back" to limiting the time that natural parents have to 
become fit before their rights in their children are terminated. 167 
Despite preventing change and development in policies, the 
argument could be made that a policy should be able to receive 
constitutional protection through the courts when three-fourths of 
the states have adopted it because that is the constitutional standard 
for ratifying an amendment to the constitution. 168 However, state 
acceptance of a policy within the federalist marketplace should not 
be made the equivalent of state ratification of a constitutional 
amendment. Court recognition of a fundamental right removes the 
recognition of that right from state power to a greater extent than 
ratifying a constitutional amendment because a constitutional 
amendment can still be repealed by the states. 169 
Despite the negative effects of granting monopolies to rights in 
the federalist marketplace, court recognition of natural rights is still 
appropriate because natural rights help to preserve the integrity of 
the federalist marketplace of state experimentation. Since the 
introduction of the Bill of Rights to Congress, natural rights have 
been limited to "those rights which are retained when particular 
powers are given up to be exercised by the legislature," such as the 
freedom of speech, and to those rights "which . . . result from the 
nature of the compact," such as " [ t] rial by jury.'t170 These rights, in 
addition to other natural rights such as participation in the political 
process, should be protected because they ensure that competition in 
the federalist marketplace of state experimentation will continue 
without significant interference. 
However, even widely accepted state policies should be allowed 
to remain subject to future competition within the federalist 
marketplace, without the protection of the legal barriers that are 
165. See, e.g., LYNN 0. WARDLE & LAURENCE C. NOLAN, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF 
FAMILY LAW 295 (2d ed. 2006). 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 9, at 27. 
169. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI,§ 1 (repealing the eighteenth amendment). 
I 70. Madison, supra note 76, at 40. 
419 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2013 
established when courts provide the policy with constitutional 
protection, until those policies become part of the social foundations 
of society. Limiting this monopoly-granting power of the federal 
courts to natural rights would allow the necessary, foundational 
rights to remain free from government regulation and, at the same 
time, would allow the law to improve and change in response to 
experience and changed circumstances. This solution to the 
seemingly unlimited power of the Supreme Court to declare 
fundamental rights under the doctrine of substantive due process 
makes sense from an economic perspective and is consistent with 
the original intent behind the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
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